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Alumni Association

Professor James A.
Gardner tells NYC alumni:
“New York’s judicial selection process is fine –
it’s the party system that needs fixing.”
James A. Gardner, Joseph W. Belluck and
Laura L. Aswad Professor of Civil Justice,
spoke on “Judicial Selection in New York
After Lopez-Torres” at the annual alumni
luncheon last January at the Union League
Club. Since then, the Supreme Court issued
a ruling in Lopez-Torres. The Court reversed
the 2nd Circuit and upheld the present
system. The following is a summary of his
remarks:

N

ew Yorkers have long been
dissatisfied with their judicial elections. In a sad parody of democracy, the real decisions are made not by the
electorate, but by local party bosses who decide who will run and whether judicial elections will even be contested.
Last year a federal court pushed judicial
election reform onto the state legislative
agenda by invalidating the existing system.
Unless that ruling is reversed by the
Supreme Court, which recently took the
appeal, the state must craft a new system or
face judicial imposition of open primaries
for judicial offices.
While public and judicial concern over
New York’s dysfunctional judicial selection
process is understandable, it is misplaced.
There is nothing wrong with the structure
of New York’s judicial selection institutions.
The real dysfunction lies in New York’s party system, which is utterly moribund.
Judges typically are chosen either by appointment or election. Judicial appointment can yield outstanding judges, but is
susceptible to abuse in the form of patronage. New York switched in 1846 from appointive to elective judgeships partly to prevent exactly this abuse.
Electing judges, however, has its own
drawbacks. The public may be unable to
evaluate the qualifications of judicial candi-
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dates. And judges who run for election
must raise money, opening them to the influence of special interests.
New York’s present system is a reasonable hybrid meant to combine the advantages of appointment and election, while
avoiding their respective risks.
The state’s system of electing Supreme
Court judges proceeds in three stages. First,
voters from each party elect delegates to a
judicial nominating convention. The delegates then convene and select their parties’
judicial candidates. The final selection of
judges is referred back to the people at the
general election.
By including the people, this method
guards against patronage appointments.
Yet by leaving the identification of judicial

150
U B

L A W

F O R U M

candidates to elected delegates, the system
gains the benefits of appointment by wellinformed observers. On paper, then, New
York’s method for selecting Supreme Court
judges ought to work as well as any other.
The problem today is that the state’s judicial selection system isn’t working as intended. Although the public continues to
perform its role, the parties have badly perverted the system. They extort donations
from judicial candidates. They enforce an
extralegal system of judicial promotion
from lower to higher courts. They drive
away qualified candidates who are unwilling to play ball. And they collude to thwart
popular choice by cutting deals about
whom to run, when, and where.
In short, the parties are not competing,

as they should, for the approval and votes of
the electorate. Why not? The short answer
is that New York’s party system is dead. Although the reasons are complex, much of
the present dysfunction can be traced to the
bipartisan gerrymander of the state legislature.
In a modern democracy, the people
control government indirectly by replacing
one set of rulers with another. Alternate
sets of rulers are supplied by political parties competing for the people’s votes. But in
New York, party democracy has been
thwarted by the parties’collusive legislative
gerrymander, which for thirty years has allocated control of the Assembly to Democrats and of the Senate to Republicans.
This gerrymander fatally undermines
party democracy because it prevents the
electorate from holding any party accountable for the actions of the government. Because of the gerrymander, no party can be
voted out of the chamber it controls, nor
can a single party take control of the entire
government. Since neither party can be
disciplined by the voters, neither party has
any incentive to be responsive to their wishes.
Most proposals for reforming New
York’s judicial selection process would substitute either gubernatorial appointment or
open primary elections. Yet neither reform
is likely to make a difference until the party
system is fixed.
Virtually all proposals for appointment
would limit the governor to appointing
candidates who have been cleared by a bipartisan screening commission. But if the
parties are not accountable, there is no reason to expect screening commissions under
party control to stop treating judicial appointments as party patronage.
Open primaries wouldn’t fare much
better. Insider candidates supported by the
party organization would have a huge advantage over outsiders because of their access to party campaign resources and expertise. And the parties could still make
cross-nomination and noncompetition
deals to crush outsider campaigns or coopt serious independents.
Real party accountability will not be
possible until, at a minimum, the bipartisan gerrymander of the state legislature is
broken up. Only when political parties are
forced actually to compete with one another for control of the legislature can New
York voters influence the operation of their
government and the content of its policies.
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